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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ELECTION LAW: TOO BIG TO FAIL?

CHAD FLANDERS*
There’s no question that election law is now a huge growth field. We have
passed well beyond the early questions about legitimacy—does election law
deserve to be its own field of study?1—and into a period of unparalleled
theoretical and practical flowering. There is no shortage of election law
articles in journals (and, of course, there is a journal dedicated to election
law2). There is also, it seems, no shortage of cases to be litigated, and no
shortage of casebooks with which to study them.3 There is just a lot of stuff
going on in election law.
Too much stuff, I fear. Or at least too much stuff for the beginning teacher
to master and then be expected to transmit to his or her students. Metaphors of
growth certainly seem to abound in election law. Rick Hasen likens the
growth of election law to the stages of a person’s life; we have passed from
birth to puberty and now may be entering middle age.4 Heather Gerken
recently has compared election law to a nation, and urges openly (and
admittedly “bombastically”) that election law should have “imperial aims.”5
But might we worry, too, about imperial overreach? Or might we worry about
starting out as the young hip teenage Elvis, only to turn into the bloated,

* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I thank Christopher Jones
for extremely helpful comments on a previous draft. Christopher Bradley and Jud Matthews
saved me from several mistakes; alas, I have not avoided the rest of them.
1. Symposium, Election Law as Its Own Field of Study, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095 (1999).
2. The Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy will be publishing its eleventh
volume in 2012 and is available online at http://www.liebertonline.com/elj.
3. There are currently no less than three major Election Law casebooks in print, and at least
two more on the way. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI,
ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2008); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S.
KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007); MICHAEL DIMINO, BRADLEY SMITH & MICHAEL SOLIMINE,
VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW (2010).
4. Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Election Law at Puberty: Optimism and Words of
Caution, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (1999).
5. Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: What Election Law Has to Say About
Constitutional Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 7, 9 (2010).
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middle-aged Elvis?6 The preface to the third edition of the great IsacharoffPildes-Karlan casebook (the one I used when I took Election Law in law
school,7 and which I use in teaching Election Law) says that, “[c]asebooks, like
most of us, tend to get fatter as they age.”8 Could election law stand to lose
some weight, slim down a bit? Does it need to become something more
manageable?
This last question especially should concern those of us who teach Election
Law. What are we supposed to teach when there is so much stuff out there to
teach? Or more pointedly, what can we cut without feeling guilty about it?
This is a question I did not squarely face when I first taught Election Law as a
two-credit seminar.
Instead, I thought I could have it all. Citizens United was coming out,9 so I
could not cut campaign finance: that seemed tantamount to professorial
misconduct. Instead, I spent three weeks on it. As a result, the Voting Rights
Act (“VRA”)10 got short shrift: I can’t blame my students if they end up
thinking that nothing really happened with the VRA after 1982. My coverage
of Bush v. Gore11 was also compressed to the space of a little under one class,
although I now think (for reasons I articulate later in this Essay) that this
wasn’t such a bad thing.
I want, in this Essay, to think a little out loud about what topics in election
law are those we really must teach, and what other topics we can get away with
not teaching, or at least not teaching as thoroughly. What is the story about
election law that we ought to tell our students, and in that story, what are the
bits we can leave out? In a word (or a couple of words), I want to draw a
rough-and-ready distinction between the core of Election Law and its
periphery. What needs to be kept in Election Law, and what can be safely
farmed out to other classes or to other seminars on election law topics (or to an
independent study)? This is an important question not just for those who teach
Election Law, but for law professors generally. As Election Law grows in
6. See, e.g., Phil Arnold, Voting for the Elvis Stamp, ELVISBLOG.NET (June 15, 2008, 8:05
AM), http://www.elvisblog.net/blog/_archives/2008/6/14/3743972.html. In 1992, voters got to
choose between paintings of “Young Elvis” and “Old Elvis” for a commemorative United States
Postage Stamp—although the appellation of “Old Elvis” was not without controversy. See id.
(“Elvis was only 38 in the Aloha shot, so ‘Old Elvis’ was not really fair. However, some folks
were even meaner and called it the ‘Fat Elvis.’ That was totally outrageous, because Elvis trained
and dieted for months before that show, and he was in terrific shape.”).
7. As another minor measure of Election Law’s size, I took Election Law twice in law
school (from Owen Fiss and Pamela Karlan), and almost took it a third time (from Heather
Gerken).
8. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 3, at v.
9. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
10. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).
11. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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popularity, the legal academy should have a clear idea of what exactly the class
is about.
Election law, unlike certain banks or the American economy in general,
isn’t going to fail anytime soon. But it can lose its focus and drift by becoming
too big. Like any celebrity, it can face the risk of wanting to become too many
things to too many people. As election law grows older and matures as a
subject, it ought to take stock and reflect on what is really central to it as a field
of study, and why.12
I. ELECTION LAW: THE CORE
I think there are three issues that every Election Law teacher must cover;
issues that form the “core” of election law. They are topics that show how
election law is unique, and how there are features of election law that the
student cannot get anywhere else. These topics are the reason that Election
Law merits being a separate class (and the structure of the major casebooks
reflects this focus).
I treat these three issues, below, as themes that should form the framework
of any Election Law class. How a particular professor teaches these themes—
what cases and methods he or she uses—will differ. But I hope to have
captured something like a consensus on what the broad sweep of Election Law
should be about: a story not just about individual rights, but also about the
aggregation of those rights, and the role political parties play in helping voters
and promoting candidates (as well as making the machinery of elections
possible). Again, I hope that what I say in this Part will be relatively
uncontroversial, and certainly at the level of abstraction at which I work. I
want to leave it open to different professors to tell the broad story of election
law in different ways, to give different emphases to the same recurring (and
enduring) themes.
What will be more controversial is the suggestion that what lies outside of
these three topics should be treated as “electives”—things that an Election Law
class might cover, but does not need to. Indeed, what lies outside the core
might be better covered in another class or (possibly best of all) in a seminar

12. A few more caveats before I begin. As someone who does not practice election law, my
interests in the subject tend to be more theoretical. I cannot, and probably could not, teach a
wholly “skills-oriented” Election Law course (which is not to say that I do not want my students
to know, and know well, the black letter law of elections). Further, I also come at teaching with a
firm preference for depth over breadth. For those who prefer the latter approach, my emphasis on
focusing on three election law themes in great detail might fall on deaf ears.
Finally, I have only taught Election Law as a two hour seminar, so my concerns about
“fitting it all in” may be due to the constraints of that format. Those who teach Election Law as a
class truly may be able to have it all.
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dedicated solely to the topic. But this latter point is an argument I leave for the
next section of this Essay.
What then are the core topics of election law, topics that an introductory
class on election law simply must cover? I think there are three: participation,
representation, and political parties. But these are general labels. What do I
mean by them?
A.

Participation

Participation is to my mind the key value in election law. The recent, and
salutary, focus on the structure of election laws has to a certain degree
obscured this fact.13 It is true that each person’s vote must, to have an impact,
be aggregated with the votes of others. And there are of course all sorts of
ways in which that aggregation can be frustrated, so that the value of one
person’s vote is diluted, as I detail below. But this debate never gets off the
ground if there is not first the participation of the individual voter. No votes in
groups (of any kind) unless there are first individual votes.
The right to participate in elections also has the nice feature of being an
exciting historical story to tell. The story of who gets the vote goes through
any number of oppressed groups: women,14 African-Americans,15 the poor,16
and the young.17 It’s a way of telling law’s sad and heroic story all at once: the
slow (sometimes painfully slow) march to inclusion and equal rights for all
groups. And along the way, it hits on how important, even symbolically, just
having access to the vote is. Even if the vote isn’t for the winning candidate,
and even if structural features prevent a favored candidate from getting a fair
shot, just the mere fact of being able to vote represents a triumph. It is a
measure of one’s inclusion in the community, a clear signal that “one has
arrived” as a citizen. What better way to start off a class on election law, and
to really sell the importance of the subject, than with that history?
But as recent litigation and legislation in the area of photo identification
attests, there is still an ongoing debate about how far this inclusion should go.18

13. For a good overview of the individual rights-structures debate in election law, see GuyUriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 649–70 (2007).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
18. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (finding Indiana’s
voter identification law constitutional); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006)
(finding Missouri’s voter identification law unconstitutional); Chad Flanders & Jamie Rodriguez,
Voter ID: Still Wrong After All These Years, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Apr. 17, 2011, 10:54 PM),
http://stlbeacon.org/voices/in-the-news/109685-critique-of-voter-id-bill-flanders-rodriquez
(discussing the history of voter ID law in Missouri as Missouri legislature debates constitutional
amendment to supersede Weinschenk).
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Can states require that voters have not simply some form of identification, but
photo identification? The cases here invite comparison with the poll tax, and
yet the analogy is not quite exact: students, in my experience, wrestle with to
what extent the state has an affirmative obligation to help voters vote, and to
what extent the burden falls on the voters themselves. Should the state
automatically register voters? Should it bus voters to the polls? How far does
the state’s guarantee of the right to participate go?19 The concerns that
motivated the historic struggles for the right to participate show no signs of
going away.20
B.

Representation and Aggregation

But the right to participate in an election is not the whole story. People
care about what happens to their ballots after they have made the (at least
symbolically important) act of casting a ballot. People want their vote to
count, and ultimately, they want their candidate to win: we want the right
person in office, representing us. But there are many things that can get in the
way of this. One way a person’s vote might not really count is if they vote for
a bad candidate, a real loser: by voting for him or her, they are throwing their
vote away because they are voting for a candidate who cannot possibly win,
and does not deserve to win. This type of result should not worry us too much.
There are other reasons why votes might not matter, though, that ought to
concern us and which form the basis of the next chapter of the election law
story.
Consider the ways in which votes that are cast can be worth less than other
votes. If districts are unequally populated, but each district gets one
representative, some voters will get more bang (in the form of greater
representation) for their buck. We might be all equal at the voting booth across
the state, but voters in larger districts will have a diluted vote. This of course
was the problem before the great redistricting (“one person, one vote”)
decisions changed everything.21 By making districts equal, every vote was
roughly worth the same across districts, thus each person casting a vote would

19. See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J.
1289 (2011); Joseph Fishkin, Voting as a Positive Right: A Reply to Flanders, 28 ALASKA L.
REV. 29 (2011); see also Chad Flanders, Spelling Murkowski: The Next Act, A Reply to Fishkin
and Levitt, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 49 (2011) (discussing various Alaska cases involving assistance to
voters).
20. Also of note here is the legislative movement afoot in many states (and to a lesser extent,
at the federal level) to reenfranchise ex-felons. See generally Pamela Karlan, Convictions and
Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN L.
REV. 1147 (2004).
21. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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be casting an equally weighted vote.22 No Election Law class can or should
get away without teaching the one person, one vote cases.23
Or take the case where votes are nearly worthless. Suppose that district
lines are drawn along racial lines to favor the majority race, and that voting is
polarized by race. A district that has majority whites will always have its
favored (white) candidate win. The minority will never win, even if they all
vote the same way. There aren’t any barriers to the minority group actually
voting, but there are real barriers to their vote mattering. The minority group
can go through the motions of voting, but their votes will never be able to be
votes for a winning candidate. We say something very similar, though not
identical, about districts that are drawn along partisan lines.24
It was problems like these that led to the realization that voting cannot be
considered purely an individual right. You can cast your ballot, but if that
ballot isn’t capable of combining with other ballots to actually win an election,
then your individual right isn’t worth much. And this is the problem (for
instance) with gerrymandering, either political or racial. When lines are drawn
so as to effectively make it impossible for a certain voting group to win, then
the right to vote of the individuals that make up those groups are rendered
practically meaningless.
In short, one can lose one’s vote in ways other than being blocked access
to the polling place. This is the key lesson of the second part of the election
law story, one which follows fast upon the first story. It turns out that voting at
the ballot box isn’t all that matters, and that you can lose your vote in all sorts
of ways. One can be effectively disenfranchised if certain structural barriers
are in place that make your vote not count, or not count as much. And this
means that to guarantee the right to vote, we can’t just think about individuals
voting; we have to think more broadly, about the structure of the system they
are voting in. To know what the right to vote means, practically speaking,
students need to know about the obstacles not just to participating in the
process, but also to aggregating one’s vote.
C. Parties
But there is a third, important mediating factor between voters voting and
candidates being elected, and that is the political party, which forms the final
part of the election law story as I see it. Parties in American politics are the
mechanism by which voters are acquainted with their possible future

22. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
23. See Joey Fishkin’s excellent attempt to untangle the meaning of “one person, one vote.”
Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
24. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139–40 (1986).
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representatives.25 They also supply the mechanism—the primaries—through
which voters first actually choose their representatives.26 It is hard to imagine
American politics without parties, even though there wasn’t really a place for
them in the early design of the Republic.27 But now parties are indispensable
to understanding the American political process, and students need to see how
they are in fact indispensible.
Students need, especially, to see the neat conceptual space parties occupy
in American constitutional law. Parties are groups, but they aren’t just any
kind of group. They are, perhaps unique to associations, partly private and
partly governmental. They allow private citizens to gather together and to
select someone who will represent them. But in doing this, they form a crucial
part of the overall mechanism the government has for filling its offices. This is
the lesson of the White Primary Cases, although even now that message is
ambiguous.28 The White Primary Cases viewed from one angle look like sui
generis set of cases: they are another instance of the court aggressively
intervening to stop racial injustice, even when the presence of state action was
debatable.29 But they also stand for the idea that parties are quasigovernmental entities, even if they remain private entities all the same.30 They
do the hard work of translating the various desires of voters into a candidate.
They give voters a focus that they might otherwise not have.
In a way, the study of political parties is the least “law-like” subject of the
suggested topics. The most important historical cases about parties are the
White Primary Cases, and the ongoing relevance of these cases to election law
is less than transparent.31 Still, the dynamic of party politics is vital for
understanding election law: how parties choose candidates, how they police
membership, and how the state can regulate how parties run things.32 On these
issues, there is no shortage of interesting cases.33

25. See Chad Flanders, What Do We Want in a Presidential Primary?: An Election Law
Perspective, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901, 922 (2011).
26. Id.
27. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 17 (2005).
28. See Chad Flanders, White Primary Cases, in OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL, POLICY, AND LEGAL HISTORY (forthcoming 2012).
29. Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U
L. REV. 750, 757 (2001).
30. Id. at 758.
31. But see Brief for Petitioner at 34–35, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-553).
32. Flanders, supra note 25, at 922.
33. For a good discussion and citations to recent cases, see Robert Wiygul, Private Rights or
Democratic Virtues? Justice Scalia and the Associational Rights of Political Parties (2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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***
All three of these subjects are, I think, essential for understanding
American election law, and for understanding election law’s story. A class on
election law that didn’t talk about all three in some depth just wouldn’t be a
class on election law. And although the subjects could be treated in other
classes, they cannot be treated as well, or in the same way. Take for example a
Constitutional Law class. Part of the problem is that one has only so much
time to talk about anything, let alone the one person, one vote cases. But
further, the narrative of a Constitutional Law class isn’t quite the same as the
narrative of an Election Law class. The formal right to vote fits best with that
paradigm: we are talking about including formerly excluded groups within the
circle of citizens by giving them the rights they are owed.
But the narrative of election law doesn’t—can’t—end with the individual
right to vote. We have to aggregate those votes, and we have to figure out how
to go about designing institutions, private and public, to make this aggregation
possible and fair. This part of the narrative is obscured by an individual rights
focus, one that an ordinary Constitutional Law class might encourage. This
may show that election law has some lessons to teach constitutional law, how
it too needs to focus more on questions of institutional design and the role of
groups.34 But for me, it shows almost the opposite: it shows the uniqueness of
election law, how the election law story isn’t a constitutional law story, isn’t a
statutory story, and isn’t a story about political theory. It is, in a way, a story
about all three that is not reducible to any of the three.
II. WHAT ELECTION LAW ISN’T, OR ISN’T NECESSARILY
If the previous Part was about what every Election Law class really ought
to cover, this Part is about what Election Law doesn’t have to cover, and
perhaps maybe even shouldn’t cover. Every class has time constraints, but this
may be no truer than in Election Law. Not only are there a variety of disparate
things that fall under the heading of election law, but Election Law also is
unusually susceptible to the temptation to “go interdisciplinary.” After all, not
only lawyers study elections and campaigns: so too do political scientists,
historians, psychologists,35 sociologists and (to a lesser extent) philosophers.
Election Law doesn’t have to be solely about the law. It can be about many
other things besides.
But we should strongly resist the temptation to make Election Law all
things to all people. Instead, there are some things we should think of as
possibly dispensable to Election Law. By listing them, I don’t mean that they

34. Gerken, supra note 5, at 9.
35. E.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010).
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shouldn’t be taught, but that we should be careful: some things we can safely
leave to other classes, and other things we may only want to briefly mention.
This will give us more time to spend on the things that really matter to the
subject, based firmly in the three broad themes I listed in Part I. In any event,
this list will certainly be much more controversial than the list of things that I
think ought to be included.
One key caveat: I say below that campaign finance and the Voting Rights
Act (at least all of it, the entire history) are optional topics to cover in an
Election Law class. However, if one didn’t cover either of these subjects, I
think the course would be sadly deficient. My advice is to pick one of them,
go into it in a lot of detail, and leave the other for another day.
A.

Campaign Finance

Campaign finance is, I think, a core First Amendment class, but it is not at
the core of Election Law. The key questions about whether money is speech or
whether it is property fit pretty neatly into the cares and concerns of free
speech jurisprudence. So I tend to think now that campaign finance should be
taught there, and not in Election Law.
This also fits with how the Supreme Court has come to see things.36 I
talked in the previous part about the narrative of various classes, say of
Constitutional Law or Election Law. I think campaign spending is presently,
and will be for the foreseeable future, part of the narrative of First Amendment
law, so Election Law professors need not feel too much guilt for saying to
students: “If you want to talk about campaign finance, you should take a class
on the First Amendment.”
A good measure of the swallowing up of campaign finance law by the First
Amendment is Citizens United.37 Only briefly, and only in Justice Stevens’s
dissent, is there floated the idea that spending in an election is a “distinctive”
subject matter, bound by its own rules, and not easily assimilated into normal
First Amendment jurisprudence.38 The majority was not persuaded: this was
not an election law case for them; this was a speech case.
Things could have been different, and here I may be following the drift of
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence rather than what I think normatively ought
to be the case about where election law belongs. Some have argued (for
example, Richard Pildes and Frederic Schauer39) that the first amendment in
election law should have a different meaning than in other areas, but their
argument has not carried the day. Rather, spending for campaigns has become

36. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 929–30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999).
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even more assimilated to ordinary political speech; it is not treated as
something sui generis, so that it is either subject to more or less in the way of
regulation. As a result, campaign finance’s home is, and will be for the
foreseeable future, in the First Amendment.
Of course, the First Amendment professor at one’s school may feel
differently! If campaign finance is not taught—at all—as part of your law
school’s First Amendment class, then you probably have an affirmative
obligation to cover it in Election Law. But this should be a matter of
negotiation between the professors of both classes, and whatever result you
reach should be communicated to students—either on the first day of class or
(ideally) in the course description.
B.

Bush v. Gore

Partly for reasons stemming from my own experience teaching the case,
and partly due to my reading of Rick Hasen’s contribution to this issue,40 I no
longer feel Bush v. Gore41 is an essential Election Law case. There is, first, the
simple fact that the actual case of Bush v. Gore doesn’t exist, as far as the
United States Supreme Court is concerned. They haven’t cited it, and probably
prefer that it would just go away.42 Moreover, and let’s face it, the opinion
itself is difficult to understand, poorly written, and difficult to teach. I am no
longer convinced that it is worth the effort. Further, as Hasen notes in his
piece, the case itself is now at best a distant memory to today’s students.43
Unless and until Bush comes back to life, it can probably be safely passed over
or only mentioned. We owe the case a huge debt for bringing election law to
the mainstream. But that doesn’t mean we have to teach it, although we should
mention it.
To borrow a comparison from Joey Fishkin,44 Bush v. Gore may be
election law’s Marbury v. Madison,45 a case that basically created or solidified
the discipline, but which is confusing, hard to follow, and at the end of the day
a potentially misleading guide to understanding the subject it legitimated. Just
as many Constitutional Law books have taken as their starting point something
other than Marbury,46 so too should we Election Law scholars not feel bound

40. Richard L. Hasen, Teaching Bush v. Gore as History, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665 (2011).
41. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
42. Hasen, supra note 40, at 671; Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite This Case! The
Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 141, 144 (2006),
http://www.thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/75.pdf.
43. Hasen, supra note 40, at 667.
44. E-mail from Joseph Fishkin (Sept. 27, 2011, 5:58 PM CST) (on file with author).
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
46. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING (5th ed.
2010).
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to the case that arguably “made” our discipline. We should let other cases be
our touchstones.
C. The Voting Rights Act (all of it)
This is a tough one. The history of the VRA, especially the early history,
is vital and indispensable to the understanding of election law—especially the
intersection of election law and race. It certainly fits in one or more of the
themes I listed in Part I of this Essay. And the subsequent changes to the
VRA, both legislative and judicial, are equally important. There are concepts
here—dilution, preclearance—that every Election Law student really has to
know. But the story of the VRA is long, complex, and winding; and here,
especially, there is just too much going on. The sheer number of pages—over
300—in the casebook I used47 when I was in law school testifies that choices
simply have to be made in teaching the VRA. It would be impossible to do
that much in one class, and so a person teaching a one semester Election Law
class is going to end up cutting a lot. For this reason, I think the Voting Rights
Act is a great, great candidate for a seminar, but one needn’t feel obligated to
do the whole history of the VRA in an Election Law class.
Here, too, we might worry about the direction the Supreme Court might
take with the VRA and whether this should change how much we emphasize
the VRA in our Election Law classes. Justice Roberts’s opinion in
NAMUDNO was widely denounced as inconsistent and a dodge;48 Justice
Thomas, although possibly wrong, was at least honest about the future of the
VRA.49 But now more and more scholars are wondering about the continued
necessity of the VRA, and whether this raises constitutional questions.50 So
the VRA may be a “hot topic” soon enough. But again, this might further
make the case that the VRA should be the subject of a seminar all to itself.
So what of the VRA should one teach—does one have to teach—in an
Election Law class? Not necessarily Katzenbach,51 which could probably be
skimmed or summarized. Allen52 seems to me absolutely essential, as do
Beer53 and Gingles.54 (These, in fact, are the cases highlighted in the

47. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES., supra note 3.
48. E.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 181–83.
49. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2519 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating § 5 of the Voting Rights Act “can
no longer be justified as an appropriate mechanism for enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment”).
50. E.g., Hasen, supra note 48, at 197.
51. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
52. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
53. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
54. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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Lowenstein casebook, which I think gives a manageable selection of the cases
on the VRA.55) But beyond these? I am not sure too much more is necessary,
especially if you are spending a lot of time on campaign finance. They give
students the important points in the history of the evolution of the VRA, and
the struggle to make it relevant for changing circumstances as well as fit nicely
into the representation part of the election law story that I sketched in Part I.
D. Political Science, Philosophy, etc.
Interdisciplinary work is the great temptation in law scholarship and
teaching, and not just in election law. But it is a temptation that we might be
better off resisting. Most often, I fear, it turns out to be just a watered down
version of the other discipline, as phrases such as “law office history” might
connote. This is why, when I wanted someone to talk to my class about efforts
to reform the presidential primary system—something that was more
legislative than law-like, although we did read some cases about Congress’s
power to legislate in the area of the primaries—I invited a political science
professor to come in. This was, in part, due to my own interests (I was writing
a paper on the topic at the time56). In retrospect, I wonder if the time might
have been better spent doing a little more work on the Voting Rights Act.57 It
was a good experience for me and for my students, but it ended up fitting
oddly with the rest of the class. The students, naturally enough, wanted to talk
about the legal issues involved with regulating the presidential primaries.
So although there are certainly important and vital interactions between
law and other disciplines when it comes to election law, they may not need to
be covered in an Election Law class. It suffices that the students learn the law
on the books about elections, and to see how interesting the legal questions are,
without going into elaborate theories of, say, deliberative democracy or the
legislative process. Let these topics creep in at the margins, if at all. There are
enough problems internal to the law of elections that should keep students
busy, excited, and motivated. If students are interested in the interaction of
other disciplines with election law, then they should be encouraged to seek
guidance from those who teach in those disciplines.58

55. LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 3.
56. Flanders, supra note 25.
57. My other guest speaker, much more consistent with the law-like focus of my class, was
an advocate for electing judges in Missouri.
58. This conclusion is partly based on my own lack of expertise in the disciplines that might
be relevant to Election Law (such as history and political science). If one has training in another
discipline, then your ability to import lessons from other disciplines will be much, much greater
than my own, and you should of course exploit that expertise.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

ELECTION LAW: TOO BIG TO FAIL?

787

CONCLUSION
Election law is big, but it risks getting too big. As part of the maturing of
the subject matter, we ought to be thinking about what sorts of things are
central to it, and what are at the outer limits and possibly dispensable as part of
a basic Election Law class. What do we want to claim as uniquely ours, safe
from the predatory hands of other professors and disciplines? This is a
question election law needs to face as it grows bigger and—hopefully—
matures with age.
Of course, what is central at any given time will change: this is the nature
of law as a constantly shifting discipline, responsive to changes in the political
and cultural landscape. My suggestions about what is at the periphery of
election law were dictated, to a significant degree, by the direction of the
Court—and the Court’s direction could of course change.
But my
understanding of the core was, at bottom, normative. I really think
participation, representation, and political parties are at the heart of what we
should be teaching our students. These are the required subjects, the
“fundamental themes,” of election law, and I have tried to explain why they are
in the first Part of my Essay. No Election Law course can get away without
spending significant time on each of them, although different professors will
tweak those themes in different ways.
What the “electives” of Election Law are, or should be, will be up to the
individual teacher. These may involve several of the subjects I listed in the
second Part of this Essay. Again, I did not mean to suggest that these are
subjects Election Law teachers shouldn’t teach. Not in the least! Rather, I
mean to console the Election Law teacher who thinks that he or she has to
cover them all and in depth. One can skip Bush v. Gore and campaign finance
without feeling guilty. One can limit (but not eliminate) discussion of the
Voting Rights Act. It is advice I wish I had been given before I taught my first
Election Law course.
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